Colin Huang's Interview with Caijing Magazine

Colin Huang: Alibaba, JD, Didi, Meituan—they compete like empires, with clear territorial boundaries. But I think our generation should not think like this.

On the all-powerful Taobao, an item might sell for 29 yuan, while on Pinduoduo it might be 19 yuan. If you find five friends to buy with you, you might get it for 9.9 yuan, with free shipping. In its early days, by offering a large number of 9.9-yuan free shipping products, Pinduoduo built a GMV exceeding 100 billion yuan, making it the third-largest e-commerce platform in China after Alibaba and JD. It achieved all this in just over two years, despite operating in the so-called "second half" of the internet era when traffic is increasingly expensive.

This company grew quietly, and people in first-tier cities may not have even heard of it until it became massive. Its growth trajectory is reminiscent of Kuaishou and Toutiao.

The mainstream logic in today's internet is traffic-based. Empire competition and territorial battles are the main themes, with most breakout startups being products of direct or indirect rivalry between Alibaba and Tencent. For startups in the current competitive environment of the Chinese internet, every table is full. Competing with traditional thinking means you can never break through the giants' encirclement.

In this context, Caijing interviewed Pinduoduo founder and CEO Colin Huang, who offers new insights. He believes the key to the post-traffic era is to focus on people and find more suitable, fundamental approaches for this era and for consumers. Only then can one find new business breakthroughs in seemingly saturated fields.

Caijing: What are your thoughts on Tencent?

Colin Huang: I don't think we are a Tencent affiliate.

Caijing: Some believe Pinduoduo has replaced JD as Tencent's primary strategic partner to counter Alibaba.

Colin Huang: Tencent supports us? In what way?

Caijing: Many of Pinduoduo's practices are explicitly banned by WeChat, such as click-bait and directly mentioning users' WeChat names, yet you still operate within WeChat's ecosystem. Is this tacit approval from Tencent?

Colin Huang: I don't believe Tencent supports Pinduoduo; we have also been blocked many times.

Caijing: It is said Pinduoduo has been blocked on WeChat 1,000 times. What did you do to get blocked 1,000 times?

Colin Huang: The number 1,000 is an exaggeration. Didi, Alibaba, and JD have also been blocked many times. I can't say we are the best, but we are certainly not the worst. In fact, from a platform governance perspective, Pinduoduo, as the largest transaction volume organization in the Tencent ecosystem, is under stricter control by WeChat.

WeChat's policies are constantly changing. Often, you don't know until you try; we believe some practices don't harm consumers much, such as mentioning users' names in delivery notifications to avoid errors. The key is whether it crosses the line for users.

Caijing: Has Pinduoduo taken advantage of loopholes and gray areas in WeChat's public platform?

Colin Huang: If someone thinks we are exploiting the rules and can understand it, why haven't they succeeded?

Caijing: So, you deny that Tencent gives Pinduoduo more support and tolerance.

Colin Huang: Does Pinduoduo have any privileges on WeChat? For example, JD and Mogujie have made Weixuan within WeChat's entry points, which we cannot do. Before the New Year, Tencent made us sign a non-poaching agreement; we can't hire Tencent employees without their consent. Can Tencent demand the same from Toutiao?

Recently, there were many rumors saying Pinduoduo is a scam, spreading widely through WeChat groups. I sought help from WeChat, but they refused. If Alibaba had approached them, they might have helped. I understand because if WeChat helps us, people will say it's because Tencent is our shareholder. If WeChat helps Alibaba, it's considered high-minded.

Caijing: For Tencent, this might not be a big deal.

Colin Huang: Because if we fail, Tencent won't. Tencent has countless children.

Caijing: Since the second half of 2017, Pinduoduo has gradually guided users from WeChat to its own app. Some media have said Pinduoduo is undermining Tencent.

Colin Huang: We have not aggressively pushed our app; it is more of a user-driven choice. Pinduoduo might be the only e-commerce app that doesn't force users to input their phone numbers upon login; they can log in directly through WeChat. Now, orders from our app far exceed 50%.

Creating a sharing scenario on WeChat was crucial to Pinduoduo's early rise. Initially, we had no data, so we used WeChat to understand people through people. But WeChat is not the only or ultimate scenario. Once we fully understand our users, we can create new scenarios off WeChat, using machines instead of friends to make recommendations, offering users the most suitable products. What you see now is just Pinduoduo's initial stage.

Caijing: Many of China's breakout internet startups like Didi, Ele.me, OFO, and Mobike are results of Alibaba and Tencent's rivalry. Is Pinduoduo's growth the same?

Colin Huang: Toutiao is not, so why can't we be another exception?

Caijing: The logic is apparent—Pinduoduo's existence holds significant strategic value for Tencent, giving them the incentive to support you to compete with Alibaba.

Colin Huang: I don't believe Tencent is driven by competitive logic; they are more business-oriented, with competition being a byproduct of ROI calculations. Tencent invested in Pinduoduo not to counter Alibaba but because our investment yields returns. Tencent invested in JD; did JD really counter Alibaba? Alibaba would compete with any JD, even without Tencent's investment.

Caijing: What impact does the direct confrontation between Tencent and Alibaba in retail have on Pinduoduo?

Colin Huang: Alibaba and Tencent aren't really competing yet because their share of offline retail is low. Today's internet competition is mostly about capturing traffic. However, when you shift your focus from traffic to scenarios, you'll find significant opportunities.

Caijing: What kind of e-commerce ecosystem does Tencent hope to build?

Colin Huang: I don't think they have a clear goal. Just like Tencent investing in Didi doesn't mean they're creating a transportation ecosystem.

Caijing: Using ROI to measure Tencent's actions seems to underestimate them.

Colin Huang: What's wrong with using business logic in business? Ren Zhengfei once said in an interview, what makes China strong? He said, "We grind tofu, they grow bean sprouts; together, we build a strong China."

Caijing: If you hadn't accepted Tencent's investment in 2016, would Pinduoduo still be the same today?

Colin Huang: The logic should be that because we are Pinduoduo today, Tencent wanted to invest. Tencent is more like a regular financial investor; they won't treat us particularly well or poorly. I don't consider us part of the Tencent faction.

Caijing: But your office is filled with QQ dolls.

Colin Huang: They were gifts from others; not many were sent by Tencent.

Pinduoduo's Core is Not Low Prices

Caijing: Group buying and low prices have long been tools and competitive tactics in e-commerce. How did you turn a tactic into a strategy?

Colin Huang: I once told Tencent people that they failed in e-commerce because they understood it as traffic × conversion rate = GMV. Traffic logic can't succeed today. Tencent has the most traffic in China and has invested in many vertical e-commerce sites. If this logic worked, Tencent would have succeeded long ago.

When Pinduoduo emerged, JD, Vipshop, and Mogujie all tried similar models. For them, group buying was just a tool to create GMV growth; for Pinduoduo, it's about people. We understand people through group buying, then recommend products through people, and later transition to machine recommendations. Pinduoduo's app has almost no search function and no shopping cart. Imagine replacing Toutiao's information feed with a product feed—that's Pinduoduo.

So initially, everyone sees low prices and group buying, but our starting points and directions are different, and we'll diverge as we grow.

Caijing: An investor once summarized Pinduoduo's success as capturing the third wave of mobile internet demographic dividend, targeting people with WeChat but no Taobao.

Colin Huang: Only people within Beijing's fifth ring road would say these are "down-market" demographics. We focus on the broadest base of Chinese people, similar to Kuaishou and Toutiao. It's like going to Shenzhen 30 years ago; you could make money doing anything because you chose the right direction.

Caijing: A senior JD executive commented that Pinduoduo's model is simple and crude, attracting price-sensitive customers. This means mid-to-high-end consumers may never shop on your platform.

Colin Huang: We attract value-conscious consumers. Someone might buy a Hermes bag but also spend 9.9 yuan on a box of mangoes. This has nothing to do with their purchasing power. Traditional companies categorize people by city tiers, but Pinduoduo caters to many aspects of an individual's needs. We are still far from perfect and can't fully satisfy people within the fifth ring road yet.

Caijing: You see Pinduoduo as offering "high value for money," but many see it as "cheap and low quality." Pinduoduo once had the highest complaint rate in the industry at 13.12%.

Colin Huang: We also sell iPhone Xs. Low prices are just a way to acquire users in the early stages. Pinduoduo has a deeper understanding of value for money—it's about exceeding consumer expectations. Our core is not "cheap," but making users feel they're getting a bargain.

For example, our first product was a bag of Lay's chips for one yuan, selling 10,000 bags in a day. If half the chips are still edible, consumers feel it's worth it. But if the chips arrive completely crushed, even for one yuan, consumers will feel cheated and might curse you.

Caijing: Taobao's white paper in January claimed counterfeit goods are moving from Taobao to WeChat and Pinduoduo. Is this true?

Colin Huang: From a technical perspective, this report is quite funny. I don't think they can know this. How could they?

Caijing: One of the best-selling products on Pinduoduo is a 27.8 yuan bottle of aphrodisiac, with 4.72 million units sold. Do you think it's genuine?

Colin Huang: First, any medicine or health product sold on Pinduoduo must have national certification. Secondly, health product margins are incredibly high, just like face masks. Do you think a 200 yuan face mask is effective?

Caijing: Extremely low prices require extremely low costs. How do you ensure quality and repeat purchases with such low costs?

Colin Huang: I admit Pinduoduo's control over products and services is still very basic. We are improving product quality by upgrading our supply chain and cracking down on counterfeits. No platform in China is working harder on anti-counterfeiting than us. Our repurchase rate doubled last year, and the average order value rose from over ten yuan to forty or fifty yuan.

In addition to meeting basic material needs, we design and operate many products to satisfy different psychological needs, such as impulsive buying, rational buying, and venting consumption. This is why, despite homogenous competition, Pinduoduo still attracts consumers to return.

Caijing: Is the only way for Pinduoduo to meet people's psychological needs through lottery draws and red envelopes?

Colin Huang: Lottery draws and red envelopes are the simplest forms of entertainment. This method is basic, but we are trying to integrate consumption and entertainment.

Caijing: Some believe Pinduoduo represents consumption downgrading rather than upgrading.

Colin Huang: Consumption upgrading is not about making Shanghainese live like Parisians but ensuring people in Anqing, Anhui, have kitchen paper and good fruit.

Traffic Logic is Last Era's Logic

Caijing: As a fast-growing startup, when will Pinduoduo's accumulated management issues erupt?

Colin Huang: Companies don't have clear puberty like children, with noticeable acceleration at the beginning and deceleration at the end. Companies grow gradually, meaning problems don't erupt suddenly; they occur daily.

The biggest problem now is system capacity not keeping up with scale development. Taobao has established basic rules for platform governance, such as merchant credit systems, which we can learn from. But in some areas, like agricultural product logistics, we need to explore on our own.

Caijing: What's the most pressing management issue now?

Colin Huang: Reducing manual intervention in rules. Manually selecting and recommending products inevitably leads to corruption. In our first year, an operator was imprisoned for corruption, and I fired a third of the operators. In the future, Pinduoduo will move from manual selection to fully automated, algorithm-driven selection.

Caijing: Pinduoduo is very light now, without controlling inventory or having its own warehousing and logistics systems. Will it become heavier in the future?

Colin Huang: We won't do procurement or logistics. Alibaba does it well; why should we? Many companies do everything because they don't trust others.

Caijing: What's this year's strategic focus?

Colin Huang: Supply chain upgrades will be our strategic focus for a long time. Pinduoduo's ultimate model is to enable upstream mass customization, but our current investment in upstream and the entire industrial chain is too weak.

Caijing: Pinduoduo's operations employees say their only performance metric is GMV. How can a company with such high growth pressure balance short- and long-term strategies?

Colin Huang: Our assessment prioritizes retention and repurchase first, GMV second. In fact, we don't want to grow; I want to slow down GMV growth.

Caijing: But you spend a lot on advertising.

Colin Huang: Advertising is to show consumers we are not scammers.

Caijing: Your strategy and vision differ from how Pinduoduo employees understand the company. They still see it as traffic-first. Why the disconnect?

Colin Huang: These employees have been educated in the old traffic mindset for years. The company is only two years old; I haven't done a good job unifying our philosophy, but we are trying from top to bottom. Now, I'm on one end, the entire society and media are on the traffic end, and the employees might be in the middle.

Caijing: Pinduoduo has 300 million users. How long can the traffic dividend last?

Colin Huang: All Chinese people should be our users. I think there will be rapid growth for the next 2-3 years.

Caijing: Do you spend money on traffic now?

Colin Huang: Compared to Toutiao, it's much less.

Caijing: How do you build a business model with 9.9 yuan free shipping?

Colin Huang: Alibaba has already proven this model works, relying on advertising and commissions. We currently only charge payment processing fees.

Caijing: Pinduoduo's product mix focuses on fruits and fast-moving consumer goods. People might think, "I spent 10 yuan on half a box of bad and half a box of good fruits, and I got a bargain." If Pinduoduo wants to expand to all categories, it will face brand upgrading, direction, and growth rate issues. How will you address these?

Colin Huang: Expanding to all categories is still traffic logic; upgrading is the same. Upgrading is a condescending perspective from people within the fifth ring road. I don't think Pinduoduo needs brand upgrading or to expand to all categories. We need to do things that match, allowing suitable people to buy suitable things in suitable scenarios.

Caijing: What are the inherent shortcomings of a company that relies on the broadest base of Chinese people?

Colin Huang: First, you'll face significant public opinion waves. Second, companies like ours must shoulder more social responsibility, with a broader reach than Toutiao.

The recent rumors about Pinduoduo being a scam made me very anxious. If I were WeChat or a government department, what would I do? Many entrepreneurs handle PR themselves, a self-sacrificing approach. Can our new generation of entrepreneurs avoid this? Entrepreneurs will eventually age, but companies must continue to thrive, relying on a self-sustaining mechanism rather than individuals.

Caijing: What is Pinduoduo's mission and values?

Colin Huang: Our mission is more affordable and enjoyable, letting consumers buy more affordable items and enjoy the process. Our value is being principled.

Caijing: How can a principled company be blocked 1,000 times by WeChat?

Colin Huang: Being principled means doing what's right for your position. We want consumers to participate in more marketing activities, which is our business duty. The rest is about balancing marketing reach.

Caijing: When JD was valued at $20 billion, it had clear core competencies—logistics barriers (user experience), all-category expansion, and a high-quality user base in first- and second-tier cities. What are Pinduoduo's core competencies?

Colin Huang: I think JD's core is that courier companies can't do e-commerce, and e-commerce companies don't want to do courier services. Our core is that people within the fifth ring road can't understand us.

They Compete for Territory, I Aim for Differentiation

Caijing: A peer of yours said Pinduoduo could take away 40% of Taobao's orders. Is this an overestimation or underestimation?

Colin Huang: We compete with Taobao in different areas, targeting different scenarios for the same users. Differentiation allows for faster growth, so it's not about taking away Taobao's orders. Just like Facebook grew, Google competed with Facebook, but both coexist long-term. Facebook's growth didn't affect Google's because they operate in entirely different scenarios.

Caijing: Wang Xing also talks about competing in the same direction rather than trying to topple each other.

Colin Huang: Wang Xing talks about his empire's boundaries, moving in the same direction but not saying where to stop. Didi and Meituan grew in a highly competitive environment, but Pinduoduo's growth environment is different. We found new business breakthroughs in a seemingly saturated field, avoiding excessive competition.

Alibaba, JD, Didi, and Meituan compete like empires, with clear territorial boundaries. But I think our generation should not think like this. Pinduoduo and Taobao are more like different dimensions gradually merging; Pinduoduo uses Alipay and Cainiao.

Caijing: Taobao has launched Taobao Special Edition to counter Pinduoduo.

Colin Huang: We see it as a compliment.

Caijing: A senior Alibaba executive said Pinduoduo sees itself as the next Alibaba, but they see Pinduoduo as a low-end version of Juhuasuan.

Colin Huang: I haven't studied Juhuasuan. We don't want to be the next Alibaba. Pinduoduo is a unique model, and we are in the early stages of it. You can call us low-end or basic, but you can't ignore us.

Caijing: Taobao has been promoting a personalized feed and content distribution reform, highly similar to Pinduoduo's strategy. What makes Pinduoduo unique?

Colin Huang: Pinduoduo's and Taobao's models are fundamentally different. Taobao operates on a traffic logic, mainly through search, where users find products themselves, requiring a massive SKU inventory to meet long-tail demand. Pinduoduo focuses on matching, recommending products to consumers, with limited SKUs but structurally rich offerings.

Taobao advocates for C2B but struggles because personalized search is still long-tail. It's challenging to do reverse customization. Pinduoduo aggregates massive traffic to limited products, enabling reverse customization with scale, significantly reducing costs. This is the difference between Walmart and Costco. Pinduoduo's ultimate positioning is to be a different Costco for different people.

Caijing: You seem to underestimate your competitors. Currently, less than 50% of Taobao's traffic comes from search, and this percentage is decreasing, with recommendation, live streaming, content, and events taking the majority.

Colin Huang: Taobao's direction is correct. But as one of the most successful companies of the last era, transitioning to a new era is challenging. Their mainstay is search, so any reform weakens search. Search is a minor feature in Pinduoduo, not even on the homepage. It's like Baidu trying to do what Toutiao does; they face obstacles from their past success.

It's like I'm Shenzhen, and they are Shanghai. Shanghai was far more advanced, and it may still be, but I'm younger and have no burdens.

Caijing: Some say Pinduoduo will face all the problems Taobao encountered (counterfeits, traffic saturation, government regulation).

Colin Huang: We face fewer challenges in some areas, thanks to Alibaba's immense contribution to the e-commerce infrastructure over the past decade.

Caijing: Are there any problems Taobao won't face but Pinduoduo will?

Colin Huang: As a newcomer, we face more skepticism. It's like joining a table where five people are already eating; they don't want you to join, and those under the table don't want you up either, so you face dual pressure. Also, our rapid growth means we encounter all the problems Taobao faced in ten years within a short period.

Caijing: Why not start a new table or find a less crowded one?

Colin Huang: In China's competitive market, every table is full.

I love Singapore and have studied it deeply. Singapore is like a company that achieved national prosperity in a challenging environment. Because it's small, it created a model where most assets are distributed globally, not just domestically. Singapore is a small country but integrates into other major countries.

Even if you're very capable and create a small Alibaba, so what? From a visibility perspective, the world won't remember you for that.

Caijing: If you replace Alibaba, people will remember you.

Colin Huang: Even then, Alibaba will still be the first Alibaba.

Caijing: If Alibaba wants to invest in you, would you accept?

Colin Huang: It depends on the investment terms.

Caijing: It's said Pinduoduo always refuses to communicate with Meituan. Are you considering entering service e-commerce or worried they'll enter physical group buying?

Colin Huang: It's not that we refuse to communicate; I don't mingle in circles or want to interact with others. Pinduoduo currently has no plans for service e-commerce because physical e-commerce is already large enough.

Caijing: Pinduoduo can push products now and push movie tickets in the future, similar to Toutiao transitioning from text to video.

Colin Huang: Service e-commerce is traffic thinking, pouring in traffic and consuming it with different services. If we still use traffic thinking in the post-traffic era, we'll fail.

Pinduoduo emerged by not using old thinking. In people-first thinking, we should consider what people need. We aim to integrate material and spiritual consumption, not just doing service e-commerce but making consumers happy while shopping.

Caijing: Toutiao now does content feeds. Do you think they'll do product feeds in the future?

Colin Huang: Let them. Can you stop others from doing your thing? Your assumption is like Baidu wanting to do Taobao.

Caijing: New giants are exploring their boundaries. Some believe Alibaba shouldn't have left a gap for JD. Toutiao and Pinduoduo might enter the same track from different directions. Why not consider it in advance?

Colin Huang: Many years ago, Jack Ma said in an internal speech, "Why not leave a competitor?" He said the best situation is Intel and AMD. Society should have multiple species coexisting and integrating.

Caijing: Most people overthink. Most things are obvious, nothing to think about, just use common sense to judge.

Caijing: There's a rumor that you're Duan Yongping's godson.

Colin Huang: Duan Yongping was introduced by Ding Lei. When I was at Zhejiang University, a stranger added me on MSN, claiming to be Ding Lei, researching a technical issue. I thought he was a scammer. In 2002, I went to the US for grad school and met Duan Yongping. After graduating, I worked at Google and lived near him, helping him with investments.

Caijing: Duan Yongping, Ding Lei, Wang Wei, and Sun Tongyu were your angel investors. They invested before Pinduoduo existed. What impressed them?

Colin Huang: Maybe because I don't flatter. I talked about interesting things. I told Wang Wei that courier companies can't succeed in e-commerce. Have you seen a courier company succeed in e-commerce?

Caijing: Did Wang Wei believe it?

Colin Huang: He didn't. So what?

Caijing: What business and life insights did Duan Yongping give you?

Colin Huang: He said fast is slow, and slow is fast. He said things are better with a calm mind. He said ordinary people rarely have a calm mind. Personally, he's constantly improving, learning, and reading your articles.

Caijing: Sun Tongyu, an Alibaba co-founder, what's his biggest help?

Colin Huang: One is values; he's a good person. His understanding of platforms is unique. Few in China have built platforms, so this helps. He thinks platforms should consider ecological evolution at different stages, while brands emphasize unique value propositions for specific groups.

Caijing: In 2006, Duan Yongping bid $620,000 for lunch with Buffett and took you. At 26, was that day important to you?

Colin Huang: Buffett's words were simple, my mother could understand. The biggest takeaway was realizing the power of simplicity and common sense. People's thoughts are easily polluted. When judging something, you need background and facts, then courage to judge rationally with common sense. Common sense is obvious, easy to understand, but biases and personal interests blind us.

Duan Yongping taught me a business common sense—price fluctuates around value. Price will fluctuate, but if your value increases, the price will eventually match value. This common sense reassures you to increase intrinsic value, not overly worry about market price fluctuations.

Caijing: How do you understand, think, and judge unknown fields?

Colin Huang: I usually take a primitive approach—experiencing it myself. Most people overthink. Most things are obvious, nothing to think about, just use common sense to judge.

Caijing: For example, how do you learn about e-commerce logistics and finance?

Colin Huang: Why learn? Most knowledge is useless. Solve problems when they arise. Duan Yongping taught me to have no big ambitions, just do well now.

I don't plan five or ten years. I have a distant goal and a close implementation. Like dating, do you end up with your planned person? Can you decide who you'll meet next?

Caijing: Do you equate dating and company strategy?

Colin Huang: Essentially, yes. Running a company is a journey. If a man is career-oriented, running a company is like dating because you'll fall in love with it.

Caijing: Your employees say you don't manage operations or hold many meetings.

Colin Huang: Think clearly. Are you really that capable?

Caijing: What do you see as the CEO's fundamentals?

Colin Huang: I'm not a typical CEO. I input values and culture and set life goals for employees. I handle sudden, unprecedented, unassignable issues.

Caijing: Employees say your decisions are final. Do you think most people are foolish? Are your decisions and judgments clearly superior?

Colin Huang: That's not my self-perception. I think most people are stronger than me in most areas; I'm better in a few.

Caijing: Which areas?

Colin Huang: Isolating external pressure, rational thinking, sometimes contrarian thinking. In the stock market, I wasn't scared when many were, and I was pessimistic when they were enthusiastic.

Caijing: What's your recent focus?

Colin Huang: I'm thinking about how to measure the value for money of spiritual consumption, unlike material consumption. I haven't figured it out yet.

Caijing: Share a regret from your growth.

Colin Huang: I

was always top in school, too goal-oriented, wasting too much time being a good student. I realized it late.

Caijing: You achieved financial freedom before Pinduoduo. What's different this time?

Colin Huang: Simply put, it's for a sense of presence. Creating something impressive that earns respect.

When Jobs returned to Apple, he made an ad saying you can praise, insult, or say anything about him, but you can't ignore him.

Caijing: Why care about presence?

Colin Huang: If you don't pursue money and don't lack it, what else can you pursue?

Some pursue being the most respected company, but that's hard to measure. Some pursue being the biggest or most profitable, which is scary. The best companies are incomparable—you are unique, making it impossible for others to compare.

Caijing: Besides Pinduoduo, what do you want to do or achieve?

Colin Huang: I hope to become a real researcher. A good model is Benjamin Franklin on the $100 bill. He stopped engaging in commerce at 40, focusing on science and inventing the lightning rod. I believe non-profit research can contribute more to humanity.

Caijing: You always say you want to be unique. Why start with e-commerce operations and game companies?

Colin Huang: Why still do profitable things? Because I haven't evolved to do purely non-profit work. I hope to do non-profit research in the future, but doing business without profit is unethical. You should be a principled businessman.

Caijing: An investor familiar with you said you're not ambitious.

Colin Huang: If you're born a mouse, you shouldn't aim to be an elephant, or you'll die. If born an elephant, aiming to be a mouse will kill you. Ambition depends on your capabilities.

Caijing: Pinduoduo's valuation is said to exceed $150 billion, but you've never disclosed the actual value. Why?

Colin Huang: If everyone lies and you tell the truth, the truth is seen as a lie. When I first sought funding, the company was doing well, but investors thought I was lying. They'd discount the industry standard by 20-50%. Later, when Pinduoduo gained some fame, fundraising was funny—lying made them believe.

It's like my dad buying a real watch, and people said it was fake. Later, when I had money, he wore a fake watch, and they said it was real. The world is like this.